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The opening paper by Julie Dickson explores the possibilities that her approach to method in legal philosophy offers for an explanation of transnational legal phenomena.
Her methodology, which she calls 'Indirectly Evaluative Legal Philosophy', owes a debt to that of HLA Hart and Joseph Raz in the sense that it attempts to articulate the distinctive character of legal phenomena from the point of view of participants within a legal order. In the course of the discussion, she sets out certain 'dangers' to be avoided and 'desiderata' to be attained if-to quote Dickson herself-'our theories of law are to be sufficiently attuned to, and appropriately illuminating regarding, the domain of transnational law'. 4 Specifically, Dickson warns against two all-too-easy assumptions:
that the growing scope and scale of transnational legal phenomena represent an entirely new challenge to legal theory, and that analytical legal philosophy itself has remained largely ignorant or non-cognizant of non-state forms of law. However, she claims that any method that seeks to provide an adequate theoretical account of forms of law outside of the state context must articulate the importance of law in the distinct and diverse contexts it emerges. Dickson claims that her method can achieve this aim, whilst also ensuring that legal philosophers avoid the temptation to prematurely venerate or endorse law's value in moral terms-a temptation that she believes it is vital to resist.
In his paper, Michael Giudice uses a specific conceptual problem at the heart of EU law-conflicting views as to its ultimate source of validity-in order to critique the adequacy of the method endorsed by many of those in the positivist tradition (such as Raz and, indeed, Dickson). This tradition seeks to elucidate a concept of law that is faithful to the conceptual distinctions drawn by those who administer, or who are subject to, law, and that is sometimes called 'conceptual analysis'. In doing so, Giudice considers, but ultimately rejects, the philosophical soundness of the legal pluralist conclusion that the ultimate criterion of validity in EU law is simply relative to the viewpoint of participants within each particular legal system. His main conclusion is that conceptual analysis can only ever form the starting point of a theoretical explanation of the nature of law, which thereafter requires what he terms 'constructive conceptual explanation'. More precisely, Giudice argues that the legal theorist cannot shirk his or her responsibility to evaluate and decide upon the respective merits of each of these competing and incommensurable validity claims.
The contribution by Richard Collins pushes this reasoning even further, arguing that a purely descriptive, value-neutral jurisprudence is impossible. His conclusion is
propelled by an analysis of one of the most under-theorised yet critically significant explanatory elements of legal conceptual analysis: the legal official. Specifically, the idea that officials accept an ultimate rule of recognition within each particular legal system is seen as crucial to the concept of law. Collins argues that in the absence of a clear explanation and justification as to why the official viewpoint is to be prioritised, the concept of officialdom acts merely as a 'boot-strapping' device, allowing legal philosophers to presuppose, rather than justify, the importance of a constitutional hierarchy to the coherence of a legal system. In the absence of such a hierarchy at the international level, public international law appears deficient as a legal system. However, he claims that this conclusion can only follow if legal theorists are explicit about why such a hierarchy is important and, by implication, what purpose it serves. Given that there may well be strong normative reasons for retaining the decentralised, non-hierarchical character of international law, Collins instead concludes that our assumptions about law's functional purpose must be either scaled back, or else remain focused upon, and contextualised to, particular legal orders.
Picking up on the analytical and normative methods discussed in earlier papers, Anne van Mulligen seeks to both describe and reconstruct the process of 'deformalisation' of the international legal order. As he explains, deformalisation describes a set of interrelated and complex claims, but to locate this term at its most general level, it describes the displacement of formal modes of law ascertainment and reasoning by a more technocratic, managerialist approach, which emphasises law's ability to achieve Individually, each of these five papers offer important contributions on topics of contemporary interest in legal philosophy as well as in the theory of international and transnational law. Taken together, however, the represent a more significant attempt to engage mutual learning between these fields. They demonstrate how by focusing on the specificities of international and transnational legal orders it is possible to rethink and potentially enhance the explanatory capability of legal theory. Moreover, the papers show how methodological debates in jurisprudence can help contribute to a better understanding of what it is to 'do' international and transnational legal research.
